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66 Organizing the territory
In contrast to the prominent position Hennebique generally 
granted to bridges in its advertising strategy, those built 
by the company in Northern Africa appear only occasionally 
in its publications and exhibitions. True, bridges were less 
representative than other types of projects of its activities 
on that continent. However, we may also wish to consider 
the extent to which they fit the image the firm wished to 
project. Despite the limited publicity Hennebique gave to 
such works, its sales agents and proxies expended consid-
erable energy in situ, prospecting for projects and devel-
oping them. Of course, no potential contract was neglected. 
Nevertheless, the quest for major projects stands out from 
the design of smaller scale operations, and according to 
a 1906 letter, bridges are structures “with great publicity 
potential.”106 The desire to expand south of the Mediter-
ranean here went hand in hand with the broader ambition 
of “conquering the Department of Ponts et Chaussées”107 
that François Hennebique had shown since his beginnings. 
Although railway companies and some industrialists were 
interested in reinforced concrete for the construction of 
their projects – especially in Egypt, where as early as 
1903, the Parisian firm built two bridges108 - it is in fact 
official recognition which counted the most. In a busi-
ness sector dependent mainly on public authorities, it 
was probably simpler to build in a protectorate country 
such as Tunisia rather than in colonial territories, with 
a “narrow and puerile administrative formalism”109 casti-
gated by Hennebique and its representatives.110 Thus in 
Algeria, where convincing civil engineers was as uncer-
tain as in mainland France, the consistent efforts spent in 
this way were slow to bear fruit, as an agent regretted: 
“Unfortunately, as you can see, although there are plenty 
of projects (and how many of them have we dismissed!), 
completed constructions are rather rare.”111
For all that, beyond the borders of Algeria, this observation 
could in reality summarize more broadly Hennebique’s posi-
tion in Northern Africa up until World War I. Whether or not 
these schemes were actually completed, designs prolifer-
ated. More than sixty projects were studied in Algeria before 
1914; about fifteen, in Tunisia; a dozen, in Egypt. Company 
policy was tried and true: in particular, it consisted of 
establishing its authority by producing quantities of design 
files. The profusion shows the productive strength of the 
Hennebique network and also highlights its adaptability to 
highly varied situations and, above all, its reactivity to the 
frequent redefinition of programs. But the course of project 
development also reveals that the organization was occa-
sionally cumbersome. Its efficiency was sometimes hobbled 
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Bridge over Malah wadi, Ténès, Algeria 
(1905-1908), Hennebique central 
office, eng.; Louis Didier and Société de 
Fondations par Compression Mécanique du 
Sol, cont.: Trials
353-m bridge over the Nile, Cairo (1903), 
Hennebique central office, eng.: Detail of 
a piling sunk to 7 meters; Unbuilt project 
drawn for a competition
Railway overpass for Les Chemins de Fer 
de l’Oasis, Cairo (1906), Della Riccia, ing.; 
Hennebique, cont.: Preliminary design, unbuilt
by communications difficulties between participants, accen-
tuated even more by distance. Often, a project fully designed 
in Paris arrived at the North African agency so late that the 
agent had to rush to meet the deadline to submit a bid – 
if it was not too late altogether. Regardless of the real 
consequences of tardiness, it was often a source of tensions 
between the central office and the sales network. Agents 
were frustrated when deals hovered out of reach, and the 
head office sternly hurried projects: for example, in 1907, 
it reminded the contractor in charge of the Ténès bridges 
that “the satisfaction given by the bridge will determine the 
future of reinforced concrete in Algeria.”112 This essay exam-
ines bridge production by Hennebique in Northern Africa, 
1900-1910, in this light. In a context marked both by the 
firm’s expansionist dynamic and by an official resolve to 
regulate the use of reinforced concrete, the strategies of 
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Bridge over Sefah wadi, Ténès, Algeria 
(1905-1908), Hennebique central 
office, eng.; Louis Didier and Société de 
Fondations par Compression Mécanique du 
Sol, cont.: Sketch of Hennebique project on 
print of previous project
persuasion at work, both in the design of the structures and 
in the preparation of design files, are worthy of attention.
Breaking into the market: Hennebique’s potential to adapt
Regardless of the impact of the “propaganda” developed 
by Hennebique,113 the public authorities were undoubtedly 
more sensitized to the advantages of reinforced concrete in 
a geographical context where the flash flooding character-
istic of a wadi frequently demolished structures, sweeping 
away steel decks and washing masonry piers away. Even 
engineers who were least inclined to welcome licensees or 
general agents supported the new material – for example, 
mentioning how quickly reinforced concrete could be 
poured, or its resistance to salinity, close to the sea – 
when asked for a price or project offer. Indeed, many engi-
neers contacted Hennebique representatives with a project 
in hand, already designed by their own department – most 
often in steel construction – in the hope of “improving” it 
or, on the contrary, simply for the purpose of “comparing 
the systems as applied to entire projects.”114 Shaped by a 
culture of mistrust, Hennebique’s usual practice sought 
to limit the risk of information leaks by sending only a 
draft, which moreover was not systematically accompa-
nied by design specifications. Nevertheless, at a time when 
the perspective of regulation of reinforced concrete made 
Public Works more intransigent, this strategy of profes-
sional secrecy may not have been relevant. “This is a ques-
tion of principle that must be answered. Should we satisfy 
the Algiers engineers, who demand to see construction 
drawings in order to assess projects?”115 asked general 
agent Reymond in 1907. 
The preference for private agreements was expressed at 
all levels of the Hennebique network. However, once public 
officials had Hennebique’s plans and price estimates 
in hand, they were often likely to call for competitive 
bidding. This practice also lent itself well enough to the 
firm’s strategy, especially when Hennebique intended “to 
break into the market for steel construction.”116 At a time 
when Hennebique still dominated the reinforced concrete 
industry, the art of the alternative plan, well known to 
entrepreneurs, was above all an opportunity to attract 
attention to the material. Thus, in entering the competi-
tion opened in 1903 for the construction of three bridges 
over the Nile, connecting the island of Roda to Cairo and 
Giza (the largest of which spanned 535 m), Hennebique 
observed that “the specifications, although they do not 
explicitly demand reinforced concrete, do not exclude it, 
either.”117 Henceforward, though Hennebique’s sales pitch 
touched on the company’s long experience – going back 
to the bridge at Châtellerault in 1899 – the main thrust 
of the argument was to disqualify steel from all points 
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Bridge over El-Akoum wadi, Tlétat 
el-Douaïr station, Algeria (1910), 
B. Reymond, eng.: Preliminary design, 
unbuilt, sketch by B. Reymond
Bridge over Damous wadi, Dupleix, Algeria 
(1905-1906), Hennebique central office, 
eng.; B. Reymond eng.; Louis Didier and 
Société de Fondations par Compression 
Mécanique du Sol, cont.: Detail of a span, 
unbuilt project
of view. For example, when a call for bids specified the 
“monumental character” of the planned structure, Henne-
bique asserted “it is a well-proven fact today [...] that 
steel construction is not architectural”118 (in contrast to 
the potential of reinforced concrete), and furthermore, the 
quest for monumentality “does not always lead to exces-
sive spending, especially when the engineer-architect uses 
the [reinforced concrete] judiciously.”119.
The range of constructions encountered in the projects 
submitted by the Hennebique network fundamentally 
reflects the diversity of technical and commercial cultures 
of the players. Indeed, design often seems like a collec-
tive process, in which the summary draft prepared by the 
local agent or by a contractor – on the basis of his own 
views and sometimes quite independently – constitutes the 
basis for the Paris office’s designs. The manner in which 
each party envisaged reconciling technique, economy, and 
esthetics sometimes shows differences in strategy. The 
plans themselves also attest to these interpretations, if 
only through the series of different solutions for the same 
project. If among the Hennebique agents a taste for arched 
bridges, or at least for the refining of arches, can be identi-
fied, other types of structure were also chosen, determined 
by the constraints of the site, by the cost, or simply by the 
skill of the contractor who had won the contract. Thus for 
the Lamy Bridge in Constantine in 1905, Reymond regrets, 
like his contacts on the rue Danton, that the contractor had 
presented a plan for a bridge with girders rather than the 
one designed by the head office: “The form with an arch 
would have had a far more preferable appearance and I am 
convinced that it would not have resulted in extra expense, 
but Mr. Didier, to whom I had given the task of dealing 
with the mayor, judged differently.”120 The plans also illus-
trate a transposition into reinforced concrete of types from 
construction in steel, such as the cantilever bridge or the 
tied-arch or bowstring bridge. This last type of construc-
tion, implemented as early as 1906 in a bridge over the 
Beja wadi in Tunisia (40 m span), occupied a privileged 
position in Hennebique’s production. But at a time when Le 
Béton armé columnist Paul Gallotti was castigating these 
forms, for the issue was competing with the beauty of steel 
construction,121 this structural type was sometimes adopted 
only as a last resort, especially when the subsoil made it 
impossible to establish abutments able to resist lateral 
thrust. If the question of foundations is moreover very often 
crucial where clay is the dominant substrate, Hennebique 
again had an advantage when hoping to prevail over its 
competitors. The fact that it held a patent on a system 
for deep pile driving (“Compressol”), through a company 
it had taken over in 1902, was a strong argument for an 
“all-concrete” solution that could enable Hennebique to win 
contracts by concentrating tasks. For example, the case of 
the bridge on the Medjerda at Sidi Zehili in Tunisia shows 
how these different factors affected the design of the struc-
ture, for which three solutions were studied successively 
between 1907 and 1911. First, a plan for a three-arch 
bridge was drawn up, for a privately agreed contract. When 
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Bridge over Béja wadi, road from Medjez 
el-Bab to Souk el-Arba, Tunisia (1906-
1907), Hennebique central office, eng.; 
Jean Peloni, cont.: Construction site
Bridge over Medjerda wadi, Sidi-Zehili, 
Tunisia (1907-1911), Hennebique central 
office, eng.; Jean Peloni and Société de 
Fondations par Compression Mécanique 
du Sol, cont.: Project for cantilever bridge, 
1908
competitive bidding was opened instead, Hennebique’s 
engineers preferred to submit a cantilever bridge (with 
a central span of 56 m). This change required the use 
of Compressol for the pilings and therefore the services 
of the Hennebique subsidiary Fondations par Compression 
Mécanique du Sol. The latter company finally obtained the 
contract in its entirety after the withdrawal of the initial 
agent (Peloni), who had brought the business to Henne-
bique but missed the deadline for submitting a bid. During 
the works, the form of the structure was changed signifi-
cantly for reasons that are not clear from the archives, but 
which could be connected to the composition of the soil. 
The deck finally consisted of bow-strings resting on the two 
pilings already under construction, and raised, as well as 
on a newly driven median pier. 
The “rational, ideal solution”122
The range of bridges designed by Hennebique exemplifies 
the adaptability of reinforced concrete, constantly touted 
in its advertising. However, the media campaigns organ-
ized from 1905 in the bridge industry tended to focus more 
specifically on the formal or esthetic qualities of the new 
material. The idea was that reinforced concrete was the most 
suitable and rational material for the architecture itself of 
these works, which were the quintessence of rationality, at 
least as characterized at the time. Several key operations 
in Hennebique’s expansion in Northern Africa attest to this 
approach, being connected with emblematic projects and 
constructions the company then used for its prestige and 
ambitions. Thus, in 1905, the plans for a bridge over the 
Damous wadi near Dupleix, Algeria, and for a road overpass 
at Gabbari train station in Alexandria, never completed 
but each presented as the firm’s “first major feat of engi-
neering” in the relevant countries, reflected the aura of the 
Mativa Bridge built in Liege, Belgium, for the world’s fair 
there the same year. It was more than a question of image, 
as Hennebique’s engineers seemed to pursue the Mativa 
approach in other projects. The design’s public success was 
obviously an asset to Hennebique’s representatives in their 
dealings with government civil engineers, who had only 
recently been won over to reinforced concrete. But the lines 
themselves of the new bridges derive from an aspiration to 
produce “20th century bridges.” 
The series of plans for the bridge over the Damous 
wadi (total length 200 m) shows the scheme being 
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Bridge over Medjerda wadi, Sidi-Zehili, 
Tunisia (1907-1911), Hennebique central 
office, eng.; Jean Peloni and Société de 
Fondations par Compression Mécanique du 
Sol, cont.: Completed tied-arch bridge
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Bridge over Ouassal wadi, Mateur, Tunisia 
(1913-1914), B. Reymond, eng.: Perspective
simplified significantly. Hennebique’s initial proposal in 
October 1905 derived from an earlier steel-deck bridge 
project established by the authorities. While retaining 
the number of piers and their rhythm, the Parisian office 
designed a five-arch bridge suggesting it was made 
of stone. This satisfied the government engineers, who 
objected only to “the thinness of the key, for esthetic 
reasons, not because of strength.”123 Yet the following 
month, a completely different design was prepared by the 
offices in Paris: the planned abutments were replaced by 
half-spans conceived on the principle of the cantilever. 
This structural change was accompanied by a general 
refinement of the bridge’s lines: the proportional relation 
between the breadth, now significantly reduced, of the 
piers (50 cm) and the opening of the arches (between 
24 and 40 m depending on the hypothesis) are more 
reminiscent of the Passerelle des Arts in Paris than of a 
stone bridge. These changes seem to be less the result of 
the client’s request than of a new philosophy at Henne-
bique. Handwritten notes on a reproduction of the first 
blueprint, requesting radical corrections, summarize the 
guidelines: “Keep the opening wide. Don’t obstruct it with 
piers. With reinforced concrete, they can be made very 
thin. They are thus less likely to cause a washout, and 
are also less expensive.”124 Although the comments were 
strictly “in-house” at the firm, they are the exact echo 
of the rhetoric developed at the time by Paul Gallotti in 
Le Béton armé. In November 1905, he put forth the same 
idea to assert the superiority of reinforced concrete over 
other building techniques.125 Repeating the argument in 
the magazine in April 1906, Gallotti invoked the authority 
of 18th century École des Ponts et Chaussées founder 
Jean-Rodolphe Perronet. According to the author, he 
“admirably defined the true esthetic of bridges: obstacles 
reduced to a minimum in the riverbeds, arches, just what 
is needed to support the lintel, the flat stone which must 
constitute the roadway, no useless superfluities, every-
thing that cannot be justified being irrational.”126 Gallotti’s 
interpretation of Perronet’s precepts naturally leads him to 
conclude that Hennebique’s Mativa Bridge in Liege is “the 
epitome of the ideal bridge Perronet dreamed of.”127 But 
as a critic, Gallotti also commented on other bridges 
Hennebique was building at the time. For example, he 
admires “cut-waters shaped like plowshares,”128 for their 
naturalism, echoing the spirit of the design for the bridge 
over the Damous wadi. 
Intended to cross railway tracks rather than flowing water, 
Gallotti’s comments on the overpass at Gabbari Station in 
Alexandria, 1905 seem to reflect the same reasoning. If 
its overall thinness results primarily from the need to 
find a compromise between the size of the trains and 
the rather low level of the street above, it undeniably 
shows architectural intentions about issues going well 
beyond merely wooing the contracting authority. Clearly, 
the configuration of very slender piers in the construction 
lends itself admirably well to the discourse on the poten-
tial of reinforced concrete: though their breadth of 60 cm 
is a “concession that we make to esthetics,” it does not 
weaken them in any way. Were a train to derail, the author 
says, the locomotive “would simply smash like an apple 
thrown on a rock.”129
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Gabbari Station street overpass, Alexandria 
(1905), Hennebique central office, eng.; 
Émile Servin, eng.; Léon Rolin & Padova, 
cont.: Unbuilt project, plan, section, 
and elevation
An acculturation at work?
The role of builders in the popularization and official accept-
ance of reinforced concrete no longer needs to be shown. 
Hennebique’s design files, studied here, show some of the 
methods by which this process worked. It is noticeable even 
in the daily routine of the various figures of the building 
industry, from contractors to the public services. Thus, at 
the beginning of the century, a technical culture identifying 
with the firm was constituted, not only by the head office 
in Paris, but also in response to a demand from the agents 
themselves, faced with learning the new science of reinforced 
concrete. A request from the Egyptian agent, Émile Servin, in 
1909 shows this: “I would be grateful if you were to ask 
Mr. Serra and Mr. Dufour if they would be so kind as to study 
in detail the calculations for the bridge as I have planned 
it for both methods, the Hennebique method and the official 
one, so that in the future, I will no longer be taken as I have 
been this time, and that I can present a bid that conforms to 
the requirements without your assistance. For this, please do 
not spare me any explanations because in the calculation of 
the arches there are points which I have never fully under-
stood and I am always uneasy when I have to apply them.”130 
Although the letter is primarily related to the communications 
dysfunctions slowing down the transmission of information 
and plans within the Hennebique organization, it also reveals 
an aspiration to greater autonomy, equally beneficial to the 
agents themselves and to the head office. But the share 
of acculturation resulting from the firm’s communications is 
even more obvious when it is reflected in standards and 
codes by government civil engineers. As Reymond pointed 
out to his supervisor in 1907: “the program, except, however, 
as regards the breadth of the piles and the application of 
the memorandum on reinforced concrete, is inspired from 
your own teaching. In fact, Compressol is first on the list of 
construction-foundation processes.”131 Is this not precisely a 
victory of the strategy developed by Hennebique, promoting 
an identification with the materials it produces?
